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Introduction
Alexander Hamilton, urging his fellow New Yorkers to ratify the pending
U.S. Constitution in the summer of 1788, wrote that people need not fear the
provision for lifetime tenure of Supreme Court justices: such tenure would keep
the justices independent from majoritarian political pressures, thereby enabling
them both to stand firm in defense of the constitutional rights of the individual and
of the “minor party,” and also to “mitigat[e] the severity” of “unjust and partial
laws” that operate with harshness on “particular classes of citizens” but do not
amount to an “infraction[] of the Constitution.” 1 Justice Joseph Story in his
magisterial Commentaries on the Constitution, published while he served on the
Court, similarly justified independence of the judiciary from electoral politics:
“There can be no security for the minority in a free government,
except through the judicial department….[I]n free governments,
where the majority who obtain power for the moment, are supposed to
represent the will of the people, persecution, especially of a political
nature, becomes the cause of the community against one…..In free
governments …the independence of the judiciary …is the only barrier
against the oppressions of a dominant faction, armed for the moment
with power, and abusing the influence, acquired under accidental
excitements, to overthrow the institutions and liberties which have
been the deliberate choice of the people.”2
Alexander Hamilton, himself one of the founders of the Abolition Society of
New York, could not have been unaware of the racial dimension of the matter of
minority rights. Justice Story while on the Court participated in several important
cases involving slaves, a quintessential example of an oppressed minority. Outside
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of his judicial role he consistently expressed the view that slavery was an unjust
and immoral institution, and within his judicial role he did the same for trade in
slaves.3
The U.S. Supreme Court is both notorious for having issued the dictum that
under the Constitution of this country, “[The black man] had no rights which the
white man was bound to respect,”4 and famous for having declared the
unconstitutionality of de jure segregated public schools, a system that harmed
black children because it “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.”5 These well-known judicial pronouncements show the Court first reentrenching (indeed, arguably exacerbating) the majority’s oppression of a racial
minority, and the second, the Court fighting against it, as Hamilton and Story
predicted the Court would. Which is the more apt, or more typical, picture of the
Court’s tendencies over the course of U.S. history? Has the judicial branch, staffed
by lifetime appointees intended to be immune from political pressures, in fact as a
general matter served to protect the rights of the “minor party” more typically than
the elected branches have? That is the answer this book aims to uncover. And if
Hamilton and Story were correct, or if they were mistaken, which aspects of U.S.
institutions explain why?
White British settlers established the first British colony in North America at
Jamestown, Virginia in 1607. They were preceded here by French to the north and
Spaniards to the south, not to mention the native Americans, who preceded all of
the Europeans. By the time of the British landing, the European diseases to which
indigenous people had been exposed for a hundred years had already decimated
perhaps as many as ninety percent of the natives, known as Indians to the
3
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Europeans.6 In 1619, blacks too were brought to Jamestown, and initially were
treated as indentured servants, who were freed after their period of servitude. Only
in the second half of the seventeenth century did laws begin to make sharper
distinctions between indentured persons and slaves, and to link slavery specifically
to persons of African descent.7
By the time of the U.S. Constitution, although several states in the northern
U.S. had freed their slaves by legislation, and Massachusetts had done so by
judicial interpretation of her state Constitution, slavery was firmly entrenched by
law in the majority of states.8 At some point or other, prior to the Civil War, every
single state, along with the federal government, discriminated against blacks in
some way.9
Because the myriad of law-enforced discriminations in both the pre- and the
post-Civil War U.S. discriminated between “white” and “other” people or between
white and “colored,” questions eventually arose in courts over what counted as
“white.” Such cases involved not only east Asians, such as Chinese or Japanese
people, but also simply darker complexioned people such as Mexican-Americans,
people of India, Afghans, Filipinos, Syrians, Lebanese, and Armenians. This book
aims to explore the rights of racial minorities, as so perceived by the Supreme
Court, in order to judge whether the constitutional project of establishing judicial
review to be exercised by judges with lifetime appointments as a protection for the
“rights of the minor party” has succeeded, as weighed against the behavior of the
more popularly accountable branches.
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Of course, the case can be made that each of the branches to one degree or
another is “undemocratic,” but there can by no doubt that the federal judiciary has
less of institutionalized accountability to the electorate than the other two branches
do. All but the two top members of the executive bureaucracy is appointed rather
than elected, but the two at the top do face election; the Chief Justice does not.
Similarly, Congressional staff members, who are unelected, have great influence
over the legislation of the land, but, again, at least their bosses do have to stand for
re-election. Have these facts mattered in the way they were expected to? This
book aims to uncover the answer.

CHAPTER ONE 1789-1861
The Elected Branches
One year after the Bill of Rights was ratified, the Congress of the United
States adopted the Uniform Militia Act (1 Stat. 271), requiring that every free,
able-bodied white male citizen between the ages of eighteen and forty-five enroll
in the national militia and supply himself with a proper weapon and ammunition
(emphasis added.) Prior to this law many states had allowed blacks into their state
militias (although some did not, a tradition dating to the colonial period), and the
meritorious service of black soldiers during the Revolutionary War was still a
relatively fresh memory. Even with the federal law in place, many states, North
and South, ignored the racial restriction (if it was meant as a restriction, rather than
simply as a minimum membership) and enrolled free blacks in their militias,
especially during times of invasion.10
But militia discrimination was not the whole story. In 1790 Congress
limited access to naturalization for U.S. citizenship to whites, a limit that it reenacted in 1802 with the phrase “free white persons.” Senator Charles Sumner
after the Civil War failed in his attempt to have the word “white” removed from
this statute. Instead Congress modified it in 1870 by adding to whites the
permission for naturalization of “aliens of African nativity and to persons of
African descent” (pointedly, albeit silently, excluding Chinese).11
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In 1810 Congress forbade blacks to be postal carriers, and in 1820
authorized the white citizens of the District of Columbia to create a municipal
government and to adopt legal codes governing blacks and slaves.12 Congress
specifically authorized the District government to ban meetings of free blacks at
night and to use whippings in the punishment of slaves.13
In most states (including in the South) free blacks had been allowed to vote
in the late eighteenth century.14 In the 1830s, as pro-slavery sentiment heated up
(see below), a number of these states cut back on black suffrage rights, and the
newly admitted states were not extending the vote to blacks (with Oregon adding
Chinese to the unenfranchised category).15 By the time of the Civil War, the
number of states allowing blacks to vote had fallen to five.16
Some states even barred entry by free blacks, although these laws went
unenforced.17 On some occasions, but not on others, the Attorney General of the
U.S. refused to U.S.-born, free blacks the right to passports or to apply for publicly
available land, on the grounds that they were not U.S. “citizens” in the full legal
sense.18
The judicial system in the country, too, was infected with racial
subordination. Several northern states refused to allow blacks to testify against a
white person, and only Massachusetts allowed blacks to serve on juries.19
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As to unfree blacks, as the country was a mix of slave states and free states,
the Constitution and pre-Civil War legislation show a mixed record. The
Constitution omitted any explicit mention of slaves or slavery, a stylistic choice
that James Madison’s notes claimed to be a reflection of a deliberate effort to avoid
entrenching the institution of slavery in the constitutive document of a free
republic. 20 On the other hand, the Constitution notoriously contains serious
compromises with the institution. (1)The slave states were given a representation
bonus by counting each slave as an extra 3/5 of a person, instead of as zero (as
might have been appropriate, since they had zero say in who governed them). This
fact meant that the voters in the Southern slaveholding states were given a boost
both in clout in the House of Representatives (moving their numbers to 46% of the
total rather than the 41% it would have been) and in the Electoral College, whose
numbers were pegged to Congressional membership.21 (2) Congress was
forbidden to ban the international importation of slaves prior to 1808. In that year
the Congress did enact the ban. (3) Article IV, §2, cl.3 says “No person held to
service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in
consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or
labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor
may be due.” (Incidentally, each of these clauses refers to slaves as “persons,”
never as “property,” so if the Constitution were read literally, the Fifth Amendment
due process clause would have freed all slaves in federal jurisdictions.)
Congress did re-enact the prohibition on slavery in the Northwest Territory
(which had been in place under the Articles of Confederation) and in 1794 ban the
export or international transport of slaves. In negotiating the Jay Treaty the
executive branch did abandon the demand, desired by many slaveowners, that
Britain pay reparations for slaves she had freed during the Revolutionary War. On
the other hand, Congress permitted slavery in the District of Columbia and in the
federal territory that later became Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama,
and in 1793 enacted a Fugitive Slave Law. This law arranged for the recapture of
slaves, even though the relevant constitutional clause said nothing of federal
power, but simply prohibited state laws from releasing slaves and ordered
nameless parties to “deliver up” such runaways “on claim” of a party to whom
service was owed. The 1793 federal law ordered local justices of the peace to
issue a warrant allowing a purported slave-owner (or his agent) who had captured a
20
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particular person to remove that person from the state (to take back to slavery)
whenever that purported owner could present certification that he had sworn before
his home justice of the peace that he owned a particular runaway. Under this
federal law the black person accused as a slave had no right to testify or to be
defended by an attorney against the claim of ownership.22
What had been basically a mixed picture evolved after 1820 to one in which
the proslavery forces increased their influence in all three branches of government.
Southerners (probably due to the increased importance of cotton in the regional
economy) became more intransigently pro-slavery, while abolitionist and antislavery sentiment grew more widespread and more intense in the north.
Southerners claimed that abolitionist essays might stimulate slave revolts (even
though teaching a slave to read was a crime in most of the slave states23), and this
argument convinced President Andrew Jackson to have the national postmaster
authorize local postmasters (federal employees) to destroy anti-slavery tracts rather
than allow them through the mails, in flagrant contravention of existing federal law
and the First Amendment’s freedom of press clause. The House of Representatives
from 1836 through 1844 observed a “gag rule” to forbid the reading aloud of, or
discussing, petitions against slavery, despite the right “to petition government for
redress of grievance” enshrined in the First Amendment.24 The House in the early
1840s, in the context of a controversy over the Southern imprisonment of free
black sailors while they were stationed in the South, voted to reject a committee’s
resolution, which resolution would have declared, in effect, that free (native-born)
blacks had rights as citizens of the United States.25
Presidents with Senate confirmation appointed Supreme Courts that from the
beginning contained a dominant presence of justices from the South—twenty of
the thirty-five appointed prior to the Civil War came from slave states.26 How
these appointments played out in Court decisions is detailed in the section below.
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In 1850 Congress did ban the slave trade from the District of Columbia but
also adopted the Fugitive Slave Act. The latter responded to the moves by several
northern states legislating to forbid their own judges to cooperate with the 1793
Fugitive Slave Act. The paucity of federal judges was making slave recapture
increasingly difficult. The 1850 Act thus created hundreds of federal officials
(commissioners) who would hear the claims of slave-owners in quest of runaways.
If the owners showed a home-state-court-issued certificate of loss of a runaway
slave, the commissioner was obliged to appoint marshals to help in the recapture
and these could in turn demand assistance from bystanders. Once caught, the
accused black had no right to testify or to an attorney, and commissioners received
ten dollars for every “guilty” finding but only five dollars if they exonerated the
person accused of being a runaway.27 In the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854
Congress for the first time allowed slavery (according to the will of the people
voting in the territory, or “popular sovereignty”) into the territory of Kansas and
Nebraska, from which it had been barred in the 1820 Missouri Compromise.

The Supreme Court Cases
“Feelings that Might Seduce It from the Path of
Duty” -- The Marshall Court and Slavery28
It is within this context of widespread anti-black sentiments formalized into
law throughout the U.S. and the post-1820s intensified polarization of opinion on
slavery that the Supreme Court decisions are best assessed. The racial
discriminations (against free blacks) prevalent in state and federal law did not in
the antebellum years produce any Supreme Court cases.29 The most prominent of
27
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the antebellum slavery cases concerned fugitive slaves, but these did not reach the
Supreme Court until the chief justiceship of Roger Taney. By the 1820s, the
absence of procedural protections for the accused in the 1793 and later in the 1850
Fugitive Slave Act angered many northerners. Several northern states began to
intervene, both by legislating procedural protections for the accused runaway and
ordering their own judges and sheriffs not to cooperate with the slave-chasing
enterprise. These clashes between federal and state authority would eventually
produce two well-known Supreme Court decisions in the two decades preceding
the Civil War: Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), and Ableman v. Booth (1857).
Although slaves were mentioned in the Court’s first important decision,
Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) in the context of being the only persons in the U.S.
who did not share in equal rights of citizenship,30 the Supreme Court took no
slavery cases as such until after 1801 (the same year that John Marshall became
chief justice). This was the year that Congress adopted the extant slave law of
Virginia and Maryland for the parts of their territory that became the District of
Columbia. In many of its earliest slave cases, the Supreme Court’s role was that of
highest appellate court applying the law of this territory. Prior to 1801, other than
in Chisholm, the only mention of slaves in Supreme Court decisions occurred in
lists of types of property. In these listings, slavery was not singled out as
warranting special treatment (apart from the mandate regarding taxes in the threefifths clause) nor was it presented as involving special moral issues.31
During the Marshall Court years issues concerning slavery arose in the
following contexts: (1) property disputes between white people over particular
30
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slaves, which the Court handled according to rules that would have applied to other
chattel property; (2) lawsuits by slaves claiming their freedom on one or another
ground, and (3) questions of criminal law once federal law banned the export32 and
import of slaves. If one puts aside those cases where the Court was simply settling
property disputes over who owned which chattel, and focuses on the cases
involving slavery as such (i.e., on the latter two categories), what comes into view
is a picture of a Court considerably less opposed to slavery, at least for the first
sixteen years, than one might expect based on the public pronouncements of
Justice Story or the privately expressed detestation of slavery of Chief Justice
Marshall.33 It is even more puzzling if one accepts the assessment of historian
Donald Roper that in terms of private sentiments a majority of the Marshall Court
opposed slavery: two, strongly (Story and McLean); and two (Marshall and
Washington) at least, “tepidly,” in the sense of “wish[ing] it would go away.”34
Whereas some biographers tend to single out various dicta or rulings where
John Marshall’s opinions helped slaves toward freedom,35 in fact, as Table One
below reveals, he or his Court rather often sealed the enslavement in question,
EVEN in cases that were reasonably contestable to the degree of (1)producing a
non-unanimous vote on his own court, (2)provoking a written dissent in the
Supreme Court, (3)overturning a circuit court reading to the contrary (in favor of
32
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freedom), (4)presenting an argument of the (indirectly electorally accountable)
U.S. Attorney General to the contrary, or (5)involving a statute that if read literally
would have freed the slave, but where the Court constructed a legal argument
elaborate enough to produce an anti-freedom result. (These indicia of legal
contestability are noted in bold in the table). Moreover, the Marshall Court was
inconsistent in its fidelity to the relevant state common law when it came to
applying the slave code of the District of Columbia adopted from the states of
Maryland and Virginia, varying its approach so as both times to produce a proslavery result. In one instance the Marshall opinion for the Court, when
interpreting the D.C. law on slavery that governed the formerly Maryland part of
the District, substituted its own judgment as to prudent law rather than follow a
particular common law rule of Maryland on hearsay, which common law rule had
produced a decision freeing the slave.36 (This court opinion provoked Justice
Duvall, of Maryland, to author the only dissenting opinion of his life). Then, in a
later decision where following the plain meaning of Virginia statutory law for the
formerly Virginia part of the District had caused a jury to set free a slave, the
Supreme Court announced itself relieved that it had discovered a Virginia (i.e.
common law) precedent to follow (from 1818, 17 years after Congress had adopted
the Virginia law as part of the DC code) which resulted in reversing the judge’s
instruction to the jury and thereby the jury’s decision.37 In light of this degree of
available latitude at the edges in these cases, one must conclude that the Marshall
Court was clearly paying attention to more than the sometimes-cited common law
maxim that statutes are in doubtful cases to be construed “in favorem libertatis.”
And one must certainly question Kent Newmyer’s 1969 explanation of this body of
decisions: “The Marshall Court did not have substantial lawmaking discretion in
the slavery cases.”38
Other scholars, and Newmyer himself in a detailed reconsideration thirty
years later, have produced a variety of explanations for the degree to which this
Court, a majority of whose members opposed slavery “attitudinally” (as the
contemporary jargon of political science would phrase it) produced so many
proslavery decisions. Historian Donald Roper was the first to analyze the topic,
and he concluded that internal division on the Court as to the morality of slavery,
compounded by fear of antagonizing Congress into restricting its jurisdiction and
36
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by the Court’s own strong commitment to property rights, caused the Court under
Marshall to hide behind the posture that it was obliged to apply the objectively
discovered law in favor of slavery, even in cases where the law on the subject was
contestable and open to meliorative interpretation.39 Newmyer, in a biographylength reconsideration of the subject revised his earlier critique of Roper far
enough to acknowledge that there was some “indeterminacy in the common law of
slavery” that would have permitted Marshall “to extend the area of freedom,” and
that he often chose not to.40 Still, he insists (as anyone would grant) that political
and legal forces did constrain the Court in terms of the big picture; the Court could
not simply announce, “We believe that slavery is wrong and therefore will no
longer uphold it.” So one is discussing here amelioration at the edges; producing
decisions that free particular slaves, that uphold and facilitate punishment of illegal
traders in slaves, that facilitate judicial demonstration by one held in slavery that
the situation is unlawful, or that facilitate voluntary manumission. In response to
the query, “Why did the Marshall Court not do more in this direction?” Newmyer
retreats to the view that the Court did feel bound both by commitment to property
rights and to a federal system that left control of slaves to each state. He also flirts
with the possibility that Marshall’s very public involvement in the colonization
movement (as president of his local chapter from 1823 until his death, and a
lifetime member of, and big donor to, the American Colonization Society,
beginning in 1819) is more properly read as an expression of a racist desire to rid
America of blacks than of Marshall’s “intellectual opposition” to slavery.41
By contrast, law professor Frances Rudko aligns with Marshall biographer
Jean Edward Smith in reading Marshall as one who genuinely “hated” the
institution of slavery as a moral and social evil, and sees him as having believed
the best approach to fighting it was by promoting Congressional financial support
for colonization as the only realistic hope for creating incentives for voluntary
manumission. Marshall believed that such a program could be effective at least in
large portions of the upper South, and would be fair – Rudko depicts it as an early
nineteenth century version of “forty acres and a mule.” Thus she reads Marshall as
basically temporizing in those decisions that strengthened slavery, while he worked
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diligently off the bench toward the goal of having Congress deliver the U.S. from
this evil.42
Table One below, a systematic compilation of all the slavery cases that came
before the Marshall Court, is presented in an effort to sort through these competing
interpretations. The Table makes apparent two things. (1) As already noted, most
of these cases did present a legally respectable alternative to whichever holding
ended up winning over the Court. (2) The Court observably changes direction
around 1816-1817. Out of a total of 29 cases, eleven go in an anti-liberty
direction. All but one of these occurs prior to 1817. Eleven of the decisions move
the law in a pro-liberty direction (the other seven producing mixed results or one
without an obvious direction regarding liberty). The pro-liberty decisions ALL
occur in or after 1817.
It is not obvious what causes this change. One candidate for explanation is
that the cases that begin in 1817, much more typically involve the slave trade,
where Congressional sentiment has been clearly expressed. In 1807, Congress first
outlawed the importing of slaves, with a law to take effect after December 31. It
reiterated and refined this law in 1818. In 1819 it changed the law’s disposition of
captured slaves; instead of allowing states to sell them off, they had to be turned
over to the President to be returned to Africa, and Congress appropriated $100,000
therefor. In 1820, Congress declared it piracy to seize or decoy any “negro or
mulatto” from Africa into slavery or onto a boat intended for the slave trade and
imposed the death penalty therefor.43
Still, this explanation does not cover all the cases; there are a couple of early
cases on the slave trade, with respect to the 1794 law banning export or foreign
transport of slaves on U.S. vessels, and the Marshall Court responds leniently
toward the accused slave trader. Also there are cases regarding the freeing of
individual slaves in the 1816-1835 period where the Court produces a pro-freedom
decision, something it never did before 1817.
Another possibility is that because the so-called Marshall Court comprised
several different natural courts, it was the personnel change that produced the shift
of decisions. Duvall joined the Court in 1811 and Story in 1812. No one joined
42
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between1812 and 1823. Perhaps the post-1816 Court was a product of the fact that
the seven personalities on the Court needed a few years to gel as a group around
the new personnel mix, which now included the relatively ardently anti-slavery
Justice Story.
Finally, there is the possibility that the shift has something to do with
colonization policy. The American Colonization Society was founded in 181644 or
1817.45 John Marshall “was involved in it almost from its beginning,” according to
Frances Rudko, having in 1819 signed up for a lifetime membership and become in
1823 local chapter president (which he remained throughout his life). Justice
Bushrod Washington was the national president of the ACS in 1819. It is certainly
conceivable that for the judicial votes of these two morally troubled slaveowners,
being able to conceive of a way to set the slaves free without imposing millions of
unlettered black people on Southern society was what freed up their consciences to
rule in more pro-liberty ways from 1817 on.
Whichever of these explanations eventually carries the day, it seems clear
from this systematic look at the Marshall Court’s slavery decisions that something
definitely changed around 1816-1817. This something is worth further scholarly
exploration. The core details of the rulings from these cases that raise these
questions about the Marshall Court and slavery appear in the table below.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------KEY TO TABLE ONE:
1) The direction column uses a plus sign for pro-freedom rulings and a minus sign
for anti-freedom rulings.
2) Bold indicates some element of contestability in Court ruling.
3) Where opinion author not noted, it is Chief Justice John Marshall.
[insert Table One here : MARSHALL COURT SLAVERY CASES]
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1805 Adams v.
Woods,

U.S. statute of limitations interpreted so as
NOT to impose penalty on illegal
exporter of slaves.

6 U.S.336
Ct. rejected plea of U.S. to decide case
by stricter rules of the common law
rather than maritime and admiralty law,
and thus refused to reverse the acquittal
for engaging in slave export contrary to
6 U.S.406
U.S. law of 1794.
D.C. (originally VA.) statute requiring new
1806 Scott v.
residents to take oath within sixty days of
London,
intent to reside and not to import slaves,
without which slaves of new residents
7 U.S.324
would be set free after one year in the
state, is relaxed to allow heir to take the
oath after father neglected to but
before one year had elapsed.
Accepted that procedures listed in
1810 Scott v.
statute banning import of slaves to D.C.
Ben,
(originally MD.) for proving qualification
under exceptions (for owner moving into
10 U.S. 1
state with own slaves) were not the
exclusive means by which lawful
importer of slaves could prove lawfulness
of import.
1810 Brigantine U.S. 1803 statute forbidding importation
of slaves into any state that shall have
Amiable
banned such importation, and 1804 one
Lucy v.
extending this statute to the territory of
U.S.,
LA., and forbidding importation of slaves
10 U.S.330 into Orleans territory except by bonafide
new residents for own use, interpreted to
PERMIT importation of slaves into Orleans
because territorial legislature created in
1805 had not acted to ban the import.
Responded to suit for freedom by the
1812 Wood v.
offspring of Susan Davis. Suit claimed
Davis I,
that previous judicial determination of
11 U.S.271 Davis’s freedom on the grounds that she
was born of a white mother rendered her
own offspring free. Wood argued that
prior decision had settled the law only as
to her freedom not as to her birth.
Supreme Court sides with Wood.
1805 U.S. v.
Schooner
Sally,

Answer to Q.
from divided
Circuit panel.
Against U.S.
Att’y. Gen.
Affirmed
district and
circuit court
decisions.
Against U.S.
Att’y Gen.
Reverses
circuit court.
Opinion
speaks for
“Majority of
the Court.”
No recorded
dissent.
Reverses
circuit court.

-

-

-

-

Reverses
district court,
Against U.S.
Att’y. Gen.

-

Reverses
circuit court.

-
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1813

1813

1815

1816

Rejected common law rule that had
prevailed in MD. (for D.C.) to allow
hearsay of hearsay when facts at
issue were so ancient that direct
11 U.S.290 witnesses no longer alive to testify.
Brig Caroline Reversed a sentence of forfeiture of
v. U.S.,
the ship as a slave trader, because
original version of the charge—the
11 U.S.496
“libel”--was too vague to justify
forfeiture but sent the case back to
Circuit Court to allow the libel
(formal charge) to be amended.
Brig Alerta v. Slavetrading ship belonging to a
Cuban Spanish national (for whom
Moran,
the slave trade was lawful) had
been captured by a privateer
13 U.S.359
commissioned in France, at war with
Spain, and where slave trade was
not lawful. Prior to the capture the
capturing vessel had put in at New
Orleans for repairs and had
augmented its crew with U.S.
residents. Because U.S was neutral
in the French-Spanish conflict, use of
such augmented crew for a capture
of “cargo” (i.e., cargo of 150 slaves)
violated U.S. law and law of nations.
(There was no likelihood, Court
noted, that the French privateer
planned to free rather than sell the
slaves.) Court orders the slaves
returned to their Cuban Spanish
owner.
Ruled that DC [formerly MD] law
Negress
SALLY HENRY banning importing out-of-state
slaves but exempting bonafide new
v. BALL,
resident owners bringing own slaves
14 U.S. 1
and also owners on temporary
sojourns, would also exempt
someone who for a seven month
period employed a slave owned by
a Virginian, Ball, but then
repossessed by Ball, taken back to
Virginia, and then brought anew into
DC.
Mima
Queen v.
Hepburn,

Upholds circuit
court 5-1
against district
court. (Duvall
dissents.)
+/Reversed
circuit court
but
remanded
for
amended
charge.
Affirmed
circuit court.
Opinion by
Justice
Washington;
Justice Todd
absent.

Affirmed
circuit court
decision.

-
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1816

Davis v.
Wood II,
14 U.S. 6

1817

Beverly v.
Brooke,
15 U.S.100

1820

The Josef
Segunda
18 U.S. 338

1823

The Mary
Ann
21 U.S. 380

1824

The Emily
and Brig
Caroline,
22 U.S. 381

(1)Reaffirms hearsay rule of Mima
Queen. (2)Rules that prior judgment
as to ancestor’s freedom cannot be
treated as evidence of offspring’s
freedom.
Master of ship who had hired 3
slaves, from whom slaves had
escaped while docked in Liverpool,
England (where slavery is unlawful),
did not owe compensation for the
escape to owner who had hired out
the slaves, because the hiring
contract implied such risks.
Ruled that pursuant to U.S. law
banning slave importation after
1807, ship and cargo including 175
slaves, captured by commissioned
privateers of Venezuela from Spain
(and therefore property of the
privateer due to ongoing war
between Venezuela and Spain)
that had then unlawfully entered
waters of Louisiana must be
forfeited to U.S., with the slaves
delivered to overseers of the poor
in the port where ship confiscated
or other persons appointed by
state for this purpose.
Reversed decree ordering
forfeiture of slave-transporting ship
for violating federal law requiring
documentation of all “Negroes,
mulattoes and persons of color”
on board, on grounds that the libel
from the district attorney had
neglected to charge that the ship
weighed forty tons or more, but
remanded to allow the decree to
be so amended.
(1) Charge for violating U.S. law
forbidding export or import of
slaves (because under admiralty
law) did not require the formality
and technical precision of an
indictment at common law.
(2) The offense of preparing a ship

Affirmed
circuit court.

-

Affirmed
circuit court.

+

Affirmed
district court.
Opinion by
Justice
Livingston.

+

Reversed
decision of
district court.
Against U.S.
Att’y. Gen.

-/+

Affirmed
decrees of
district and
circuit court.
By Justice
Thompson.

+
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1824

The Merino,
The
Constitution,
and The
Louisa,
22 U.S. 391

for the slave trade can be proved
before the ship is completely seaready, so long as the intent is
clearly manifest.
(3) Thus the two ships at issue were
forfeited to the U.S.
(1) As to The Merino and The
Louisa (U.S. vessels attempting to
transport Spanish slaves from one
Spanish port to another), the
charge against them is not
supported by the evidence but
the evidence shows that they did
violate other sections of U.S. slavetrade laws, so decree is reversed
and remitted so that the libel
against them may be amended to
accord with the evidence.* (2)
The decree condemning and
ordering forfeited the cargo and
vessel of The Constitution (a similar
boat and activity) is upheld
except as to the 84 slaves on
board.
(3) The 84 slaves go back to their
Spanish owners who held them
lawfully in Spanish territory; had the
boat capturing them been a
commissioned vessel capturing a
U.S. boat engaged in transporting
slaves from one foreign place to
another (as was true of The Merino
and The Louisa), then the slaves
would be forfeited to the U.S.,
along with the rest of the cargo.
Since The Constitution was
captured first by a noncommissioned boat, to be brought
to court so the captain could sue
to be awarded the slaves, but
then while not engaged in the
slave trade was captured by a U.S.
revenue boat and only then (i.e.
not while engaged in slave trade)
taken to court, the owners may
retake their slaves from The
Constitution. Situation is governed

+/Reversed
and remitted
for
amended
charges to
district court
on The
Merino and
Louisa libels
(implying
approval of
amended
charge with
sentence of
forfeiture of
slaves,
cargo and
ships).
Upheld
decree as to
forfeiture of
ship and
cargo of The
Constitution,
but as to its
slaves,
reversed
decree and
returned
those slaves
to Spanish
owners. By
Justice
Washington.
As to slaves
on The
Constitution,
against the
U.S. Att’y.
Gen. as to
return of

21

1825

The
Plattsburgh,
Mar.14 23 U.S. 133

1825
The
Mar.15 Antelope,
23 U.S. 66

by the 1800 law which forfeits the
slaves only if their owners had an
economic interest in the boat or
the voyage.
Slave-trading schooner seized by
U.S. ship of war off coast of Africa
must be forfeited to U.S. because,
despite ruse of a purchase by
Spaniards in Cuba in mid-voyage
(where boat was fully equipped
for slave trade), voyage originated
in Baltimore with manifest intent to
continue to Africa, and U.S. crew
stayed on boat to Africa. These
facts made voyage violate U.S.
law.
Spanish vessel that had been
captured by a (piratical) U.S. crew
from Spanish owners, and that
held the surviving remnant of 25
Africans captured from a U.S.
slaver, and of a total of 255 slaves
from a Portuguese slaver and from
the original Antelope crew, now
having been captured by U.S.
revenue cutter in U.S. coastal
waters was in U.S. court for
violation of U.S. law, with Spanish
and Portuguese consuls in court
demanding return of the slaves to
their respective countries, and
claiming that they were lawfully
owned property under their laws.
(Preceded by 1822 decision on
circuit by Story, La Jeune Eugenie,
where French consul had
intervened re: captured French
slaver, and U.S. President had also
intervened in aid of French consul.
Story had ruled that French slave
trader vessel seized on high seas
by U.S. commissioned vessel in
peacetime would have been
tortiously seized only if the vessel
seized were not involved in piracy,
but that slave trading must count
as piracy since it was unlawful

slaves.

Affirmed
District and
Circuit
Court. By
Justice Story.

+

U.S. Attorney
General is
arguing for
freedom of
all surviving
slaves, c.180;
circuit court
had freed
only 16.
Supreme
Court frees
eventually
80%, and
turns over to
the Spanish
government
to distribute
to the
proven
owners the
20% whose
owner could
clearly
identify and
prove
ownership of
them. Partly
against
U.S.Att’y
Gen., but not
as much as

+/-
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1825

The Joseph
Segunda II,
23 U.S. 312

under laws of the country of the
boat seized. Boat and cargo
[including slaves] returned to
France for adjudication.
Additional dictum: slave trade is
by now contrary to the law of
nations and therefore always
piracy UNLESS permitted by laws of
particular sovereign governments;
alleged slave trader has burden of
proof to show this permission.)
Rules slave trade NOT contra
law of nations (rejecting Story’s
dictum), since so many states
allowed it within modern times
(even though the recent trend is
outlawing it), but grants that it is
contra the law of nature.
Slavetrade vessel is engaged in
piracy ONLY if ITS government so
rules. Only such ships may be
seized on high seas and if so will
be turned over to own courts for
trial. U.S.treaty requires return to
Spain of [slave] property captured
by U.S. pirates. Court says in this
case, “The sacred rights of liberty
and property come in conflict with
each other.” Court says since it IS
(equally) DIVIDED as to whether all
these slaves should be returned, it
will follow principles set forth by
the circuit court. Spanish
government claims 150 slaves
were theirs but, Supreme Court
adds, they bear the burden of
proving specific ownership.
Hearings eventually reduced the
returned Spanish slaves to 20% of
the total. No proof of Portuguese
owners has come forth in five
years since capture. Supreme
Court rules all other surviving slaves
are free.
Boat forfeited and sold as per the
1820 decision, had its slaves sold
pursuant to Louisiana law adopted

Circuit Court
was.

CIrcuit court
decision
awarding

0

23
to carry out the U.S.1807 law
against slave trade. Louisiana law
gave ½ proceeds from the slave
sale to the “commanding officer
of the capturing vessel,” and other
half to a charitable hospital. Court
read the ambiguous U.S. law as
implying that (1) a federal district
court had jurisdiction to decide
who received the proceeds under
state law; (2) under the state law
the “commanding officer of the
capturing vessel” had to be one
who followed up on the seizure by
prosecuting the case in federal
court and also had to be an
officer of U.S. “armed vessel or
revenue cutter.” (This decision
was superseded by the re-worded
1818 (April 20) U.S. law, which
awarded ½ the forfeiture
proceeds to whomever
prosecuted the ship as a slaver.)

1827

Mason v.
Matilda,
25 U.S. 590

D.C. (originally VA.) statute
requiring new residents to take
oath before a magistrate within
sixty days of move to the state,
declaring intent to reside and not
to import slaves, without which
slaves of new residents would be
set free after one year in the state
is here interpreted as NOT
applying to set free slaves who
had been held in VA. part of D.C.
for more than twenty years without
any evidence that owner had
ever taken the required oath.
Undoes decision of jury below that
Matilda et al. are free. Rules that
twenty years possession of a slave
should be viewed as creating a
“presumption” that the oath was
taken, so judge’s instruction to jury
erred.

one half the
proceeds of
sale of slaves
to man who
prosecuted
the libel was
overturned.
The money
from ship
and its
contents
remained
with U.S.
government.
[Disposition
of money
from sale of
slaves not
clarified until
1830
decision,
Segunda III. ]
By Justice
Story (with
U.S. Att’y.
Gen.)
Reverses
decision of
county court
of D.C. ; reenslaves
Matilda et
al. , who had
been
declared
free by the
jury of that
court,
following
judge’s
instructions
as to
meaning of
the law.
Opinion by
Johnson.

-

24
1827

U.S. v.
Gooding,
25 U.S. 460
[future
Justice Taney
att’y for
defense]

Federal criminal prosecution of
slave trader challenged as to
validity of the indictment.
Supreme Court “express[ed its]

anxiety, least, by too great
indulgence to the wishes of counsel,
questions of this sort should be
frequently brought before this
Court, and thus, in effect, an appeal
in criminal cases become an
ordinary proceeding to the manifest
obstruction of public justice, and
against the plain intendment of the
acts of Congress” [at 467-468], and
ruled unwarranted six of defense
counsel’s objections ([1]to
admissibility of testimony from the
captain of the slaver vessel, [2]to
admissibility of testimony from a
mate the captain tried to hire, [3]
to the indictment of the ship’s
owner for “aiding and a betting”
slave trade on the basis of actions
and testimony of the ship’s
captain without prior conviction of
the captain, [4]to indictment for
equipping a ship intended for the
slave trade without proving that it
had been fully equipped in the
U.S. or [5]that the owner had been
present during the equipping, and
[6]to failure to specify detailed
acts of equipping the boat instead
of equipping it in general); and
ruled two as valid ([1] sloppy
wording on failure to say “intent to
employ the ship in slave trade,”
and [2]charging as a crime the
mere sending out from a U.S. port
of a boat intended for slave trade,
as distinguished from there
equipping it as such—on this point
Story admitted he had erred in
two prior circuit court decisions –
and noted that he was differing
from the U.S. Att’y. Gen. but noted
that the AG’s position would

Answered
questions
certified
from circuit
court due to
a division of
opinion
there, prior
to its
decision.
Result: three
of the
indictments
fatally
defective
but four still
valid.
Against
argument of
U.S. Attorney
General on
convicting a
ship for
merely
setting forth
from U.S.
port to
engage in
slave trade.
Opinion by
Story.

+/-
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1828

Sundry Slaves
v. Madrazo

1829

Boyce v.
Anderson,
27 U.S. 150

[unintentionally] entail guilt for
FOREIGN slavers who accidentally
landed in a U.S. port and then
sailed forth, and that this position
followed from the literal words of
earlier statutes but had been
corrected by Congress in 1818.
Undid District and Circuit Court
decisions that took 20-30 slaves
from governor of state, who was
planning pursuant to state law to
give them to Colonization Society
for delivery to Africa, and that
rendered them to the proven
Spanish owner (and that gave him
the proceeds from additional
slaves of his that had been stolen
by U.S. pirates and then judicially
forfeited and sold by Georgia).
Reason: since State of Georgia
was a party, jurisdiction was
original in the U.S. Supreme Court.
Rejected strict liability standard
that applied to common carriers
transporting freight --“most skilful
and careful management” --in
context of carelessness in loss of
slaves transported by steamship
company, and applied the more
lenient standard used for
transporting persons, namely,
absence of negligence. In opting
for the “persons” rule, Marshall
avoided arguments made by
counsel that the rule should apply
because slaves were “intelligent
beings” with “power and rights of
locomotion and self-preservation.”
Instead he posed their difference
from “inanimate matter” as lying in
their having “volition” and
“feelings”: “In the nature of things,
and in his character, he resembles
a passenger, not a package of
goods.”

Reversed
District and
Circuit Court
decisions.
Johnson
dissented.

Affirmed
Circuit
Court.

+

+
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1829

Le Grand v.
Darnall,
27 U.S. 664
[Taney for
appellant,
urging simply
that the law
be settled.}

1830

(Josefa
Segunda III)
U.S. v.
Preston,
28 U.S. 57

1831

Menard v.
Aspasia,
30 U.S. 505

Friendly suit posed issue whether
slaveboy of eleven {Darnall], freed
by father’s will could qualify as
free (and thereby legally capable
of selling real estate to
Philadelphian) under Maryland
law that allowed testamentary
manumission of only those slaves
able to earn a livelihood. In light
of undisputed testimony that
Darnall at eleven was able to
maintain himself by such work as
household servant, Court upheld
circuit court ruling that he
qualified under Maryland law,
such that the sale was valid.
Att’y Gen. of LA. argued that LA.
deserved the proceeds from the
sale of slaves on the Josefa
Segunda, carried out pursuant to
LA. law of 1818, adopted to carry
out the U.S. law of 1807. Supreme
Court ruled that U.S. law of 1819,
adopted while appeals in the
case still pending caused the
slaves to be ordered rendered to
the President for return to Africa.
Money paid for them ($68,000)
was to be returned to purported
purchasers.
Because of prior treaty with
France, 1787 Northwest
Ordinance’s ban on slavery in NW
territory and its later reenactments by Congress and in
the IL.Constitution, had been
treated as implicitly exemptlng
the slaves owned by the French
pre-1787 inhabitants of NW
territory. Menard (of French
descent in IL) claims that he
therefore has right to own Aspasia
as the offspring of such a slave.
He tried to take her from MO.
where they had resided from 18211827, back to IL., but she sued for

Affirmed
Circuit
Court.

+

Opinion by
Duvall.

Reversed
decree of
U.S. district
court.

+

Opinion by
Johnson
(with U.S.
Att’y Gen.)

Court refuses
to review
pro-freedom
decision of
Missouri
Supreme
Court.
Upshot is
that post1787offspring
of former
slaves still
being held in
IL. can now
claim
freedom.

+
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1834

1834

her freedom in MO. and won there
in both the local and State
Supreme Court. U.S Supreme
Court denies that it has jurisdiction,
since the Missouri decision did not
“call into question” the
Congressional re-enactment of
the Northwest Ordinance, but
simply honored its ban on slavery.
Lee v. Lee
Court ruled that jury instructions
below had erred in not allowing
jury to consider whether hiring
slaves out temporarily in one
county of DC before importing
them into another had been a
fraudulent attempt to evade the
DC (formerly MD) law against
slave import, as modified in 1812
by Congress to allow moving
slaves from one DC county to
another. Court divided in half on
how strictly to interpret the 1812
act; half would have viewed the
act as freeing the slaves in this
context.
McCutcheon Court rejected claim of purported
v. Marshall,
[out-of-state] heirs to slaves set
free by will of Tenneseean. Court
33 U.S. 220
ruled that Tennesee law was clear
in permitting such freeing of slaves
(contrary to allegation of heirs).
Court ruled that offspring born
after death of testator of two tobe-freed women slaves who had
not yet reached 21, the age at
which these mothers were to
become free, remained legally
slaves under Tennesee law
(although court might rule
otherwise “if this were an open
question”), but that description of
these offspring in the lawsuit was
“too vague and uncertain” for
court action against their
manumission, so lawsuit should be
dismissed.

Opinion by
McLean.

Reversed
Circuit Court
decision and
remanded
for new jury
instructions.
Did NOT free
the slaves on
point where
Supreme
Court split
50-50.
Opinion by
Thompson.

Affirmed
decree of
Circuit
Court,
dismissing
the lawsuit,
with costs.
Opinion by
Thompson.

+/-

+
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1835

Fenwick v.
Chapman
34 U.S. 461

Court rules that executor of estate
erred in allowing orphan’s court to
sell as slaves two persons who had
already been set free under terms
of will of deceased Marylander.
Maryland law allowed such
manumission as long as it was not
“in prejudice to creditors.” Sale of
slaves was unlawful on two
grounds: (1) “If an executor
permits manumitted slaves to go
… free from the death of the
testator, it is an assent to the
manumission, which he cannot
recall any more than he can, after
assenting to a legacy, withdraw
that assent” [at 475]; and (2) when
testator declares will to free slaves,
other property, including real
estate, must be used to satisfy
debts (i.e., orphan’s court had
erred in attempting to preserve
real estate of decedent above
freedom of the named slaves.

Circuit Court
judgment
affirmed,
with costs.
Opinion by
Wayne.

+

*NOTE re: 1824 Merino case: These slaves were brought to Alabama for trial. Under
1818 U.S. law, if vessels found in violation, slaves would be dealt with according to law
“adopted hereafter” of state where slaves brought in, and slaves in this case had been
so rendered to Alabama authorities. Alabama law of 1822 made such slaves labor for
the state or else auctioned them to highest bidder. U.S. law changed in 1819 to order
such captured slaves free and made U.S. president obliged to arrange transport back
to Africa for them. Josefa Segundo III (U.S. v. Preston) made clear that the 1819 change
of U.S. law (ordering the slaves to be sent to Africa and freed) took effect upon all
decrees still pending in 1819 and thereafter.
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